ConnectWise Suspends Cloud Backup After App Credential Breach
ConnectWise disabled seven application identities and suspended its Cloud Backup service on October 17, 2026, after attackers used a stolen credential to compromise at least 162 Microsoft 365 tenants.

ConnectWise suspended its Cloud Backup and related Cloud Management services after discovering the abuse of application identities that enabled unauthorized access to customer Microsoft 365 environments. The company disabled seven specific application identities and revoked their connection certificates on October 17, 2026, at 07:00 UTC, rendering scheduled backups inoperable and cutting off access to restoration capabilities.
The affected application identities are:
| Application Name | Application ID |
|---|---|
| ConnectWise Cloud Backup | 506e08f9-6e9a-4da4-942b-a099a03644ae |
| ConnectWise Cloud Management | 2399d300-6fca-4e6a-a686-399fefe75b83 |
| Cloud Management - MS Teams | 24205314-2b89-4e07-a2a4-579e898a5640 |
| Cloud Management - Exchange Online | b78f6a77-d4e5-46fb-87e5-d1648bd02519 |
| Cloud Management - MS Graph | 0de14c77-b9b0-4137-9360-34878a929827 |
| Cloud Management - Partner Center | 412dcf96-176d-4b3a-a1b0-4981ad66971e |
| Cloud Management - SharePoint Online | b2b55f5b-7758-4719-8d8f-88ae172e6bdb |
SaaS Security and Cloud Management services were also taken offline temporarily out of an abundance of caution. Existing backup archives remain encrypted and isolated, with no current evidence they were accessed by attackers.
Attack method and technical details
Attackers used a stolen application credential to authenticate as a trusted service principal, inheriting broad permissions to access mailboxes, files, and directory data without triggering MFA. This supply-chain attack exploited a compromised client secret for the ConnectWise Cloud Backup application. The credential theft allowed the threat actor to request access tokens from Microsoft Entra ID based on the application's existing permissions.
The attack bypassed user-based multi-factor authentication because application authentication does not trigger user or device prompts. With extensive permissions for backups and management, the attacker could read and write emails, attachments, OneDrive and SharePoint files, and Teams chats. The method did not involve malware binaries but relied on automated access to the Microsoft Graph API. The attacker also used the service principal's permissions, such as Directory.ReadWrite.All, to attempt privilege escalation and establish persistence.
Scope of compromise and observed activity
The breach affected at least 162 Microsoft 365 tenants, with malicious sign-ins traced to a specific IP address and automated scripts, including privilege escalation and persistence mechanisms. Managed security providers identified nearly 1,000 Entra tenants with sign-in activity from the IP address 144.172.64[.]128, with 300 of those sign-ins succeeding. Access was blocked in other tenants where the targeted service principal was not present.
Huntress observed the first malicious sign-ins from that address on October 15 at 08:45 UTC. A second, targeted wave of manual activity followed later that day, singling out 16 tenants in policy, national security, trade, and critical mineral sectors. Activity involved automated scripts with user agents like python-requests and curl. In several tenants, the attacker assigned itself elevated roles like Exchange Administrator and Global Administrator, and added credentials to other trusted applications to ensure persistence. No specific threat actor group has been attributed to this incident as of October 18, 2026.
Response, mitigation and guidance
ConnectWise disabled affected application identities, advised partners to review tenants for signs of compromise, preserve logs, and remediate unauthorized permissions and credentials. The issue was identified on October 14, 2026, through advanced cybersecurity monitoring. Since implementing mitigations, no successful threat activity has been observed in monitored environments.
Disabling the affected connections prevents new authentication but does not reverse changes previously made inside a tenant. Previously issued access tokens may remain usable until expiration. Partners are advised to review their own and managed customer Microsoft 365 tenants, including environments with dormant connections. They must verify the status of the listed application connections and keep them disabled.
A comprehensive review should check for unauthorized mailbox forwarding, inbox rules, delegated mailbox access, application credentials, federation trusts, directory roles, and recent policy changes. Partners are advised to review sign-ins from October 13, 2026, through the current time for activity from IP address 144.172.64[.]128 and preserve audit records before containment.





