BlackX UEFI bootkit bypasses Secure Boot on patched Windows
A new UEFI bootkit named BlackX exploited an unrevoked certificate to bypass Secure Boot in an early 2026 espionage campaign targeting diplomatic agencies in Central Asia, despite victims running fully patched Windows 11 systems.

BlackX, a UEFI bootkit deployed in early 2026, leverages the unrevoked Windows Production PCA 2011 certificate to bypass Secure Boot on fully patched Windows 11 systems. The attack exploits the Baton Drop vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2022-21894, which was previously used by the BlackLotus bootkit. All known victims were diplomatic agencies in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan.
The core security failure stems from a gap in the update process. Microsoft issued a patch for CVE-2022-21894 designed to revoke the problematic certificate, but the revocation does not happen automatically. Administrators must manually trigger the certificate revocation after patch installation. The Windows Production PCA 2011 certificate expired on October 19, 2026, but without manual revocation, vulnerable binaries can still load. This allows attackers with administrator-level or physical access to install custom Machine Owner Keys and load arbitrary EFI files, completely undermining Secure Boot.
Similarity to BlackLotus and APT41 attribution
BlackX's implementation is remarkably similar to the BlackLotus bootkit, which first circulated in October 2022. Researchers found shared techniques and code reuse, with some code present in BlackX samples that was absent from the leaked BlackLotus repository. They believe BlackX was either reverse-engineered from BlackLotus or purchased its source code. The campaign is attributed with medium confidence to APT41, a Chinese state-sponsored threat group also known as Brass Typhoon. More specifically, Kaspersky linked the activity to a subgroup tracked as FishMonger, which has shared techniques like DLL sideloading.
Technical details of the exploit and mitigation requirements
Once the bootkit is installed, it loads a malicious Windows kernel driver. This driver, which was signed with a now-revoked certificate issued to Wenjiang District Mingyu Network Technology Service Studio, disables security monitoring. It tampers with Event Tracing for Windows and disables security-related processes and registry callbacks. Some of these tampering procedures are configured to run only if Kaspersky or Avast products are detected, though researchers found these routines to be ineffective. The driver also protects bootkit files by intercepting file open requests and launching Windows Calculator as a decoy.
Following the initial compromise, BlackX deployed two distinct espionage payloads. The first is a remote-access trojan that communicates through cloud storage services like Google Drive, OneDrive, and Yandex.Disk to execute .NET payloads and transfer files. The second payload uses a technique called DLL sideloading, where a legitimate googleupdate.exe process loads a malicious, obfuscated DLL named OxiDLLRunner. This DLL decrypts a file to launch shellcode and a final Rust-based payload, which retrieves additional DLL plugins from the domain archivetj[.]com.
Recommended defense and detection
Mitigating this threat requires specific manual action. Organizations must manually add the 'Windows Production PCA 2011' certificate to the Secure Boot UEFI Forbidden List, known as the DBX. Security teams are advised to monitor for unauthorized Machine Owner Key installations, unexpected EFI files in boot partitions, and command lines running a process named inst.exe with RC4 decryption keys. Microsoft has stated that exploitation of Baton Drop is not an initial-access technique, meaning attackers need valid credentials or physical access first. However, data shows that once attackers gain such access, only 37% of their subsequent actions are typically blocked by defenses. Administrators must manually add the 'Windows Production PCA 2011' certificate to the Secure Boot UEFI Forbidden List (DBX) to mitigate the threat.





